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The paper endorses the thesis that current macro imbalances are partly due to 
an excess of household savings in China, whose origin is to be found among 
other things in household uncertainty about the provision of public services 
like health care, pensions and education. Focusing on health services, 
because of their priority in the concerns of the Chinese people, we describe 
the recent trends in the provision of health care. We then argue that social 
spending by the government may have important intergenerational content, 
in that it allows higher private spending, lower inequality, higher levels of 
human capital and the like. All these factors are related to the potential 
growth rate of the economy. We conclude that a more important role of the 
government in the sector of public services, and in particular of health care, 
may help reduce the possibility of future bottlenecks, and hence help keeping 
the Chinese economy on a sustainable growth path. We conclude the paper 
by an assessment of the current debate on how to reform the system, and we 
advocate universal publicly funded basic health coverage. 
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1. Introduction 
The Chinese economy is becoming increasingly unequal. The outstanding long term 
growth performance of the country has been obtained partly thanks to the very low priority 
given to all the other policy objectives, including spatial and sector equality. But the rise of 
inequalities has been so large in size that in the past few years the phenomenon triggered a 
reaction by the Chinese authorities, in fear of social unrest that could undermine the 
economic performance of the country and its political stability. 
This paper argues that growing inequality should be combated also because it may 
have long lasting effects on human capital, macroeconomic imbalances, and the overall 
efficiency of the economy. We suggest that current public spending, in particular social 
spending (health, education etc.), has a strong intergenerational content as it affects the 
distribution of resources among generations, and hence the future level of “well being”, 
whatever the definition of the term. 
In particular, this paper focuses on health policy. In November 2007, the Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics organized the Seventh Sampling Survey on Public Sense of 
Security, interviewing more than 100,000 households
1. According to the survey, medical 
care was the top concern of the household (15.3% of the respondents), followed by a vaguer 
“social issues” with 14.3%. “Social Security”, related to the affordability of health and 
retirement came third with 13.2%. The growing public concern about health care access has 
prompted in the past few years a response from the government, which is rolling back on 
the deregulation implemented before. A new plan, “Healthy China 2020”, has been 
unveiled in December 2007 by the Chinese government
2. This plan spells out an 
intermediate objective, a basic Medicare system to be set up by 2010, with the goal of 
universal health care and equal access to public services for its 1.3 billion people by 2020. 
While other categories of social spending in China require attention because of the 
distortions and inequalities linked to their provision (notably education and social security), 
none of them seems to generate the same level of  public anxiety than health expenditures, 
and rightly so, as a decent level of health is a prerequisite for benefiting from other 
categories of social spending. If we use this perspective, the household survey mentioned 
above reveals a lexicographic ordering in household’s preferences, which justifies our focus 
on health care provision as an example of social spending. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the role of China in 
today’s global macro imbalances: we tend to agree with the thesis that the source of excess 
                                                 
1 The communiqué summarizing the results of the survey can be found on the NBS website at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20080109_402457006.htm 
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savings – a too high level of households’ saving rate – can mostly be traced to the 
uncertainty about future provision of social goods which in turn is due to the gradual 
disruption of the community based social protection system. Section 3 discusses the 
evolution of the health care system in the post reform period. In section 4 we develop the 
reasons why current social spending may have strong intergenerational content. Finally, 
section 5 gives a snapshot of today’s attempts to correct the distortions in the provision of 
health care, which are based on voluntary adhesion to an insurance scheme. After showing 
why this attempt would not have the positive effects that the authorities hope for, we 
conclude by giving some indications about what we believe to be the necessary policy and 
institutional changes for the future, and by trying  to assess whether the “Healthy China by 
2020” plan responds to these requirements. 
 
2. The sources of Excess Savings 
In the debate on global imbalances that rages in the academic literature and in the 
specialized press, the excess expenditure of US consumers and firms is usually contrasted 
with the “saving glut” (Bernanke (2005)) of other areas of the world, notably East Asian 
countries. Because of its size, China is usually pointed out as the main example of this 
world excess saving that helps sustain the current global imbalances. In fact, as figure 1 
shows, both the remarkable levels of investment that China experienced since the early 
1980s and the recent boom of the current account surplus happened thanks to an important 
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reduction in consumption, from a level above 50% of GDP in the early 1980s to the 
abnormally low level of 36% in 2006.  
This aggregate figure hides wide regional and sector diversity, along the well known 
differences in growth between coastal and western provinces, and between rural and urban 
areas (for a survey see, Lim, Spence and Hausmann (2006)). If we look at the savings rates 
(figure 2), we can observe two remarkable trends: The first is a generalized increase (that 
obviously mirrors the decrease in consumption) of savings, which today account for almost 
25% of household incomes. The second is, within this general trend, a more than 
proportional increase in savings for rural households (being on average poorer they should 
on the contrary save less). The saving rate, that in the early 1990s was lower for poorer 
rural households, has since the mid 1990s been consistently larger, and has converged only 
recently (Kraay (2000; Kuijs (2005)).  
While there is some debate as of the causes of this excessive savings (see e.g. He and 
Cao (2007), who argue that demand deficiencies are to be attributed to a decrease of 
disposable income and not to the increase in savings rate), the changing behaviour of rural 
and urban households seems to be undoubtedly related to increased income uncertainty and 
to lower social protection. A high saving rate is then a rational reaction against the increase 







1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
%
Urban Rural Average
Source: Chamon and Prasad (2007)  - 6 -
of both of those risks
3.    Chamon and Prasad (2007)  besides the growing uncertainty, point 
to the insufficient development of financial markets, as one of the main causes of the lack 
of consumption smoothing by Chinese households. 
 
In the same vein, the literature on savings, risk and insurance (for a survey, see Besley 
(1995)) documents that developing rural economies experience widespread income risk, 
and that households adapt their behaviour in order to be protected from this risk, either in 
the form of self insurance, or of more or less informal risk sharing contracts with other 
households. Changing patterns in the social contract, notably in the items that play the role 
of insuring households against risk, quite naturally affect the expected payoffs of 
households, and hence the intertemporal consumption-saving choices. Pradhan and 
Wagstaff (2005) recently provided an example of this behaviour, showing that in Vietnam 
overall consumption was positively affected by the implementation of a public health 
insurance scheme. This finding is hardly astonishing, as we know from the policy 
evaluation proposition that a change in policy affects the parameters of the behavioural 
functions of a model. In a more pedestrian way, a transfer from private to public insurances 
is equivalent to “forced saving”, which implies a reduction in (residual) private hoarding.  
As the intertemporal decisions of households affect among other things the 
distribution of resources between generations, it follows that current spending, notably in 
social items (education, health, social security), has an important intergenerational content, 
through its effect on private spending. This content, often neglected, appears to be 
particularly important in fast growing economies undergoing deep structural change like 
China. 
 
3. The Evolution of Social Spending During the Reform Period 
The health coverage system put in place in the early 1950s by Maoist China was at 
the charge of the employment unit of the workers, mainly the State Owned Enterprises 
(SOE) in cities and the communes in rural areas. Prevention was given a prominent role, 
and the system was designed to fit within the dual structure of the economy (Guan (2000)). 
In urban areas, the two main pillars of health were the Government Insurance Scheme 
(GIS), which covered current and retired government employees plus selected categories 
like students, and the Labour Insurance Scheme (LIS), that applied to SOEs. Both schemes 
were financed by the government, and offered total coverage to the employees (and 
generous, although not total coverage to their dependents). In rural areas, preventive health 
                                                 
3 Modigliani and Cao (2004) argue that following the implementation of the one child policy, Chinese 
households substituted investment in human capital with savings; while somehow exotic, this explanation also 
points to the essentially precautionary characteristics of today’s saving rates.   - 7 -
action was organized and financed through the Cooperative Medical System (CMS), ran by 
the collective organizations (communes) and subsidized by the government. The capillary 
provision of basic health care services, from prevention to cure, was provided through a 
mass of practitioners with basic training, the so called barefoot doctors. Finally, hospitals 
were owned and funded by the government. The three-tiered
4 organization for the delivery 
of health care was designed to promote the efficient allocation of health care resources 
between primary and tertiary care facilities. This system quickly extended health care 
provision, and provided an efficient framework for patient referral and treatment.  
To summarize, through subsidies, direct coverage, and low prices, the system 
provided near to universal health care. As a consequence of the focus on prevention, and on 
basic health services, the improvement in general health conditions of the Chinese 
population was spectacular. The two most cited figures are life expectancy, that almost 
doubled (rising from 35 to 68 years) between 1950 and 1990, and infant mortality, that fell 
from 200 to 34 per 1000 live births over the same period (Hesketh and Wei, 1997; 
Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005). 
 
The radical transformation of China’s society that began in the late 1970s consisted in 
a de facto privatization of the economy. The main, if not the only focus of the three decades 
since 1978 has been economic growth. The issue of a fair distribution of resources has been 
virtually absent, at least until very recently. As soon as the reform period begun, 
reorganizing the provision of public services’ quickly became a priority because they were 
seen as a source of inefficiency for the economy (Guan (2000)). The dismantlement of the 
pre-reform welfare system was extremely fast, and in some cases (like health care) there 
was no clear substitute. The main innovation introduced in the early 1980s was a strong 
reduction of central government involvement in the provision of public services, with the 
idea of freeing resources to be allocated at more productive uses. For what concerns health 
care, investment by the central government was dramatically reduced, going from around a 
third of GDP in 1978, to the current level of about 15%. The responsibility for providing 
and funding health care services was transferred to provincial and local governments, 
through the receipts of local taxation. To compensate for the reduction of transfers from the 
central government, the local communities were allowed to raise funds from some services, 
like sanitary controls and high end medical services. As was easily predictable, local 
authorities focused on the provision of these services, neglecting prevention and 
unprofitable basic health care. The main effect of this process of decentralization was a 
dramatic increase in regional inequality both in income and in public goods provision 
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(Kanbur and Zhang (2005), Qiao, Martinez-Vazquez and Xu (forthcoming), Chou (2007)). 
The richer regions (mainly the metropolitan areas and the coastal regions) were able to 
provide a decent level of public services, while the others experienced serious deficiencies 
in the provision of even the most basic public goods. Zhang and Kanbur (2005) describe at 
length the huge differences in education and public health levels that stemmed from this 
inequality. Besides the decentralization of public services’ provision and financing, two 
other specific decisions had an impact on China’s health care system. First, the government 
put in place a system of price regulation with the idea of continuing to provide access to 
basic health care. The price of routine visits and standard diagnostic tests was strictly 
regulated, while new drugs and technologies were left unregulated. Furthermore, a system 
of wage incentives was put in place, linking the remuneration of physicians to the amount 
of revenues generated for the hospitals. The result was an exponential increase of expensive 
drugs sales, and high tech services, and once again the neglect of the price regulated basic 
health care. Second, the dismantlement of the rural communes and the shift from what 
Guan (2000) calls public ownership to a multiple-ownership economy, also entailed the 
disruption of the system of safety nets that had assured basic health services for the mass of 
inhabitants of rural China. Without the CMS, hundreds of millions of Chinese peasants 
became uninsured, because of their lack of resources. As recently as 2003, surveys 
highlighted that 36% and 39% of households in urban and rural households respectively 
gave up medical treatment because they were unable to afford it. (Markus, 2004; Yu, 2006; 
Lim, 2006). Unemployed barefoot doctors were forced into the private sector, where in 
absence of regulation they found it more profitable to sell drugs or to provide high end 
services (for which they were untrained) than to provide basic health care and prevention. 
As a consequence, the price regulation and the dismantlement of the communes had the 
unintended effect of skyrocketing prices and out-of-pocket expenditures, together with a 
substantial deterioration of the quality of the service. 
Today less than one third of the population has medical insurance, almost 60% of 
health care expenditures are out-of-pocket, and national spending on health care of all types 
(including public health) almost doubled from 3.0% to 5.5% of GDP between 1978 and 
2002. Furthermore, half of this expenditure goes to drugs, compared with a worldwide 
average of 15 percent (World Bank, 2004; Meng et al., 2005). Today the number of health 
care facilities is substantially larger than in the 1970s, but they are substantially less 
efficient and less accessible than they used to be. The effect of “reforms” on the cost and 
the quality of China’s health care is quite clear:  “To many in the United States, this portrait 
of pockets of medical affluence in the midst of declining financial access and exploding 
costs and inefficiency will sound depressingly familiar” (Blumenthal and Hsiao, 2005, p. 
1168).   - 9 -
The consequence on public health indicators is also striking. All the spectacular 
improvements experienced until the late 1970s were stopped and sometimes even reversed 
by the reform (Liu, Hsiao and Eggleston (1999)). It does not come as a surprise then if at 
the turn of the century China’s overall health system performance ranked only 144
th  in a 
pool of 191 countries, well behind the other Asian emerging giant, India, that has a  rank of 
112
th (WHO, 2000, Ma and Sood, 2008). 
 
To sum up, the spectacular growth performance triggered by the reform period was 
not matched by a similar improvement in health care provision. The fading insurance role 
of the government contributed to the widening of inequality which, in turn, made the 
absence of social spending and collective insurance more problematic; this vicious circle 
until now has not affected the overall efficiency and the growth performance of the Chinese 
economy. In the next section we argue that this may not be the case forever, in the light of a 
number of theoretical and empirical results which show how increasing inequality may in 
the long run harm growth. 
 
4. The intergenerational Content of Current Spending 
The belief according to which nothing of substance would be lost if growth and 
fluctuations were studied separately, the former being linked to supply factors (technology, 
endowments and other “fundamentals”), while the latter depends on demand factors, has for 
a long period dominated the analysis of business cycles. True, no economist would have 
admitted that the two phenomena were completely independent, and many have expressed 
the idea that the building of new capacity today (investment) have long lasting effect on 
either potential output or growth (cf. i.e. Hahn and Solow). More generally, economists 
have investigated how many short term phenomena may have long lasting effect like for 
example unemployment, “false prices” in Hicks’ sense, and so on. But the two frameworks 
were not really integrated, until the emergence of Real Business Cycles (RBC) theory 
(initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1982)). What the RBC theory accomplishes is to 
present a single model able to account for growth and fluctuations. But this effort of 
construction of a unifying model was realized at the expense of demand factors that are 
absent from the RBC, which also attribute short run fluctuations to supply factors. Hence 
whether the dichotomy between growth and fluctuations holds or not, economic policy, and 
in particular social spending, has at best only short run effects through changes in aggregate 
demand. This view being obviously debatable, it has been questioned by theoretical and 
empirical work alike. For example, in a widely known paper, Ramey and Ramey (1995)   - 10 -
robustly show using a large sample of countries, that higher aggregate income volatility is 
associated with lower long term growth. 
Fatas and Mihov (2001) further document a strong negative correlation between 
government size and output volatility both for the OECD countries and, even more 
markedly, across US states. This empirical regularity is shown to correspond to a simple 
new Keynesian model in which consumers are not perfectly rational (Andrés, Doménech 
and Fatas (2008)). But it may have other interpretations as well. For example, if we assume 
the level of corruption not to be overwhelming, a higher level of public spending means the 
provision of more public goods, including social goods, and stronger automatic stabilizers. 
For both reasons – better collective risk insurances, and “built in” stabilization – the 
volatility of output will be lower
5.  
The most straightforward channel through which public spending reduces income 
variability is the smoothing of income volatility (for a survey, see Creel and Saraceno 
(forthcoming)). It has to be emphasized that income volatility in developing countries, 
where almost by definition the system of social protection is less developed, may have very 
disruptive effects on social and productive structures. As Amartya Sen has for long 
documented, in these countries the stability of growth matters much more than the level of 
growth, as a recession may have irreversible consequences on the destiny of the more 
vulnerable fraction of the population.  
In particular, social spending strengthens the correlation of current spending and 
current income, and the reduction of precautionary savings. On the other hand, one should 
also consider the opposite effect, namely that excessive income security distorts the 
incentives and results in a reduction of labour supply. This argument has been used 
extensively in the European debate on fiscal policy. In addition to not being extremely 
robust,
6 the argument can be raised only for developed countries, and has limited relevance 
for the purpose of this paper. For developing countries, in effect, it exists a vast empirical 
literature showing that larger social spending increases the level of private consumption and 
reduces its variability. To quote only two recent contributions, Dehejia and Gatti (2005) 
show that schooling duration increases with parent’s income. Similarly, Mangyo 
(forthcoming) shows that in poor households the food intake of children is directly affected 
by income increases. Increased provision of health care may also bring about a general 
improvement of the conditions for the creation of wealth. Recent estimates show a direct 
impact of household health on income and productivity (Liu et al. (forthcoming)). These 
empirical results are an indirect proof of the existence of resources’ constraints on the 
                                                 
5 On this kind of mechanism and other fundamental issues regarding stability, cf . Joseph E. Stiglitz & ali: 
Stability with Growth, Oxford University Press, The Initiative for Policy Dialogue Series, , 2006 
6 The counterexample of Scandinavian countries shows that the incentive argument has limited validity 
(Fitoussi and Laurent, 2008).    - 11 -
poorest households, that can be lifted by social spending thus leading to a more efficient 
allocation of resources. 
 
Besides its role as an “insurance” against income and consumption fluctuations, 
especially for poorer households, social spending has a more direct effect. Increasing the 
collective supply of public goods would free part of the income that is now saved for 
precaution, and make it available for investment in both physical and human capital. In 
other words, social spending could “crowd in” private expenditure and raise the economy’s 
current and future growth rate alike while decreasing its volatility.  
In a country like China, where income is growing at unprecedented pace, this kind of 
constrains play a relatively limited role for an increasing number of households, but a very 
important one for those who are not benefiting from growth, a huge number indeed. Its 
effect could become even more important when in the future the average growth rate will 
fatally decrease. 
 
Other mechanisms may also play a role. Higher civil servants’ wages would increase 
the quality of public services that are complementary to private spending in sustaining 
present and above all future growth. The same holds for expenditure geared to strengthen 
the legal system, and to set up an effective means to protect property rights.  
Furthermore, social mobility (“giving to my children better opportunities than I had”) 
is one of the engines of growth and prosperity. But social mobility is all the more likely if 
somehow “counters are reset”, at least partially, at each generation. One of the roles of 
social spending is a transfer of resources that helps reducing inequalities of initial 
conditions for the new generations. 
When thinking about some of today’s challenges – environment and the use of natural 
resources, population aging, etc. – we frequently reason as if the welfare levels of future 
and present generations were substitutes. But if we consider the infinite chain of 
generations and extrapolate for future ones the relationship existing  between two 
successive generations, say “parents” and “children” we may be led, concerning health, 
education, income stability and more generally the social protection system, to a quite 
different hypothesis, complementarity rather than substitutability,  which seems to us much 
more appealing. The hypothesis amount to saying that if the parents care about their 
children and the latter about their own children etc., there should be, at least for the kind of 
expenditures we are discussing here, strong complementarity between the welfare of 
different generations.  Current public spending on all levels of education have obviously an 
intergenerational content. What is almost universally verified is that the consent to pay by 
the parents for the education of their children is very high. The health of the parents is   - 12 -
almost a precondition for that of their children: willingly or not, current spending on health 
has thus an intergenerational content. The same can be said of a number of public spending 
items, including those which are aimed at fighting unemployment. To belabour the obvious, 
the conditions of education are certainly disturbed by the unemployment of the parents. The 
improvement of housing conditions through public schemes will likely benefit the chain of 
generations
7.  
Besides, there is a domain where the welfare levels  of present and future generations 
may be considered to exhibit an important degree of complementarity, that of social justice. 
If social justice is not a sufficient condition of complementarity it is at least a necessary 
condition. There are two reasons why it is so; the first is more of the order of a conjecture, 
the second of a constraint.  First, in a society where would prevail a pervading feeling of 
injustice, it seems unlikely that there would be space for intergenerational altruism. It 
would be hard to assume that intergenerational equity would preoccupy the members of the 
society in a context where intragenerational equity is not assured.  The second reason is 
related to the state of inequalities. When the latter are large and growing, an important 
fraction of society has not the means to project itself towards the future, even if it wished to 
do so. The difficulties of day to day conditions make it prisoner of the present. It is why a 
well functioning social protection system by giving people a feeling of fairness and 
allowing them to contemplate the future with less anxiety would benefit the chain of 
generations.  
 
This section outlined a number of mechanisms through which social spending may 
not only sustain current activity, and the standard of living of current generations, but also, 
and more importantly, affect the potential for future growth and benefit future generations.  
In the light of this discussion, the next section will describe the recent changes in health 
policy in China, and conclude on some characteristics that the reformed system should have 
in light of our analysis. 
 
5. The Role of Social Spending for Sustainable Growth 
The beginning of the years 2000s marked an important change in priorities for the 
Chinese government. The deepening spatial and sector inequality, both in income and in the 
provision of public goods, was eventually perceived as a potential cause of excessive 
imbalances, with possible effects on social stability and overall growth. In October 2002, 
the first China National Rural Health Conference was held in Beijing, and a set of reforms 
                                                 
7 Many studies have shown that housing conditions play a very important role for the success of children at 
school, which explains that part of the uneven results of schooling is due to inequalities in between present 
generations.    - 13 -
in the provision of health care was announced. (Liu and Rao (2006), Wagstaff et al. 
(2007)). The scheme is now in a pilot phase, the coverage of all counties is predicted to be 
completed by 2008. 
The New Cooperative Medical System (NCMS) is based on voluntary adhesion. The 
unit of the scheme is the county instead than the village, increasing the scale of each unit 
for better risk pooling and economies of scale in the provision of health care services. To 
enrol in the program households have to pay a flat 10 reminbi per person and per year 
contribution, that is matched by public subsidies amounting to up to 40 reminbi  for the 
poorest households (the burden is shared equally by the provincial and the central 
government). The level of discretion of each county is very high, from coverage to cost 
sharing, to fees, etc., in observance to the principle of decentralization in health policy 
introduced with the reform. 
 
A voluntary insurance scheme is confronted to all the typical asymmetric information 
problems associated with the provision of public goods. These concerns are reinforced by 
the wide inequalities in income level and in needs in the recipient population, and by the 
diversity in economic structures among provinces. Even if it is too soon to assess the 
effectiveness of the new system, an attempt has been made by Wagstaff and Yu (2007), and 
Wagstaff et al. (2007). Their first remark is that the budget of the NCMS is too small to 
significantly affect households’ out-of-pocket spending. The per capita contribution, 
including the subsidies, is around 20% of total per capita rural health spending; 
furthermore, the large deductibles, and high coinsurance rates make copayments large. The 
excessive financial burden that remains on the insured could induce the poor households to 
avoid enrolling in the scheme, thus letting out of medical coverage the group that is 
supposed to be the main beneficiary of the program (a finding that is hardly surprising, see 
also Jalan and Ravallion (1999) and Wang and Rosenman (2007)). By looking at the urban 
program, Lindelow and Wagstaff (2005) further argue that, because of the distortions in the 
pricing mechanism and in the widespread practice of fee-per-service reimbursement, higher 
end care is more profitable and hence over-provided with respect to basic health services 
(see also Eggleston et al. (2006)). As a consequence, actual spending by households may 
even end up increasing. 
The preliminary assessment of  Wagstaff et al. (2007) at any rate gives mixed results. 
On the positive side, the cost remained unchanged in spite of increased utilization of 
expensive equipment. On the other hand, enrolment by the poor was as expected low, as 
well as their access to health care. Furthermore, the authors report no evidence of decreases 
in out-of-pocket expenditure.   - 14 -
As the discussion above suggests, these results are hardly surprising. All the standard 
asymmetric information problems experienced by insurance schemes for the provisions of 
public goods are likely to be exacerbated in presence of strong inequalities and high income 
uncertainty. 
 
This overview of the reform in the health care sector, and of the recent attempts to roll 
back on some of its more harmful effects, seems to suggest a number of policy conclusions: 
 
1.  First, and in general, attention to equality should be paid, in order to obtain 
income stabilization and provide private households with a less uncertain 
environment (see also Kuijs and Wang (2006)). In particular, for the Chinese 
case, the region/sector inequality seems to be one of the most serious obstacles 
on the way of continued strong growth. 
 
2.  An effective solution to the worsening conditions in health provision seems to 
be the move towards universal health coverage. Collective insurance seems to 
be the only way to reduce the huge differences in access to health care. This 
does not mean that the provision of health services should necessarily be 
public. In fact, there is no reason to reduce private involvement in this sector, 
rather the contrary  (see Eggleston et al. (2006) for pros and cons of the 
different frameworks). Nevertheless, for a socially sensible public good like 
health care, appropriate regulation is a priority. 
 
3.  The spatial inequality that inevitably accompanied the process of 
decentralization has been a major cause for increased inequality in income and 
in social conditions. (Qiao, Martinez-Vazquez and Xu (forthcoming)). This 
calls for a central management of the health system, and/or for a system of 
strong interprovincial transfers (Chou (2007) documents a strong correlation 
between provincial government deficit and health care provision). In both 
cases problems of free riding and moral hazard should be appropriately taken 
into account. 
 
To summarize, it is our belief that a reformed health care sector should be centred 
around universal coverage to be managed centrally, or at the provincial level. In this latter 
case, nevertheless, an interprovincial transfer system would be necessary to guarantee 
financing of the insurance scheme regardless of the income level of the provinces.   - 15 -
Furthermore, very detailed regulation should be designed prior to further involvement of 
the private sector in the provision of health care services. 
 
The Chinese government has been working for almost two years at a new plan, far 
more ambitious than the NCMS. As of today (August 2008), the details are not fully known 
yet, the plan being currently fine-tuned in consultation with the various government 
agencies involved. But the guidelines were unveiled in December 2007 by the Health 
Minister Chen Zhu:  by 2010 (a date that will probably be pushed forward, given the delays 
in the finalization of the detailed plan), China will set up a basic medical and health care 
system to balance the disparity between medical access and quality of services in urban and 
rural areas, as well as between different regions within the country and for people with 
different income levels. By 2020, according to the plan, China will have completed the 
establishment of a public medical and health care services network, a universal coverage 
medical insurance system, a drug supply system and a medical institution management 
system. Most of the concerns outlined above would hence be addressed by the plan, which 
would go in the direction that the present paper envisions.  
In particular, two aspects of the plan emerge as new with respect to the current 
situation.  
The first and more important is the commitment to an increased involvement of the 
central and local government in the health sector; this would take the form of an increase of 
public spending as a percentage of total health expenditure. Such an effort would initially 
be addressed to increasing affordability of health care for the poorest households, and in a 
second moment to improve the quality of service. Increased involvement of the government 
would also take the form of a more balanced allocation of resources between urban and 
rural areas, the latter being today strongly underfunded. According to the plan, the 
government and households should split the cost of basic medical care, but the burden of 
specialized medical care would still be borne by patients directly or through private 
insurance. 
The second important innovation of the new plan concerns the management of health 
care facilities, in an effort to change the incentive structure from profits to public health 
performance. This is the part of the plan that the government has more difficulties in 
finalizing. The main lines of action are clearer definition of the responsibilities and rewards 
of public managers, and a disconnection of hospital funding from revenues; the latter 
should help curb drugs’ over-prescription, and excessive prices. 
Increased dialogue and engagement with the private sector is announced, but no 
details are given on whether this will lead to the much needed substantial redesign of the 
regulatory framework.   - 16 -
 
A careful assessment of the new plan will have to wait for the details to be made 
public. From the vague guidelines described above it seems that the burden that the 
redesigned system will impose to households is still important; nevertheless, the proposed 
reform plan certainly represents an important step ahead in the direction of providing access 
to basic health care to all citizens, regardless of their means or of their region of residence. 
If the implementation of the plan will proceed as announced, this will contribute to 
smoothing the current imbalances and to provide sustainable growth in the years to come. 
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